TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/caps/83/83capmoy.3

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                                                                                January 2, l984

MEN OF THE YEAR

Some Practical and Realistic Advice


Eight statesmen, American and foreign, suggest how to reduce
tensions


What, concretely, can the U.S. and the Soviet Union do to lower
the level of tension between them in the months ahead?  How, in
the long run, can they manage their competitive relationship
better so as to reduce the risk of armed confrontation?  TIME
asked eight statesmen, both in and out of office, to offer some
practical recommendations.

Claude Cheysson French Foreign Minister

Enormous ideological and moral differences are at the root of
the difficulties in relations with the Soviet Union. Nothing
will make these differences disappear in the foreseeable
future. However, we should aim to develop three types of
relations: exchanges and contacts that benefit both sides, arms
negotiations, and a high-level dialogue that will enable the
participants to explain their intentions and so avoid
misunderstandings.

Let us not overdramatize the crisis. It is serious, but it has
not undone everything. Trade and all kinds of contacts have
not been broken off. The Soviets value these as do the
European countries and the U.S. in the sectors that interest
them. We must maintain and reinforce these exchanges,
exercising caution, but without seeking to use them as
instruments of political pressure.

The thread of negotiations must not be broken. The START
negotiations must stay alive. In Stockholm, a conference is to
open on conventional disarmament in Europe, which has great
political importance. There is no justification for the Soviet
Union's walking out of the INF negotiations. We would view a
return to the negotiations not as a defeat for the U.S.S.R. but
as a reasonable exercise of responsibility by its leaders.

High-level dialogue between leaders of the U.S.S.R. and those
of the West, in particular the U.S., is badly needed at this
time. Such dialogue is indispensable if we are to prevent
misunderstandings over areas of tension leading to dangerous
confrontations. Mistrust and suspicion have bred a vicious
cycle that has to be stopped. Let us try to break out of it by
making the most of all the good will that exists and of every
initiative. France will not be last in this. What we can do,
we will do without ever losing sight of the fact that overtures
to dialogue must not be confused with weakness.

In the long run, last peace has to be based on recognition of
the differences between the Soviet system and the system of
countries that want to live in peace on the basis of equal
rights and responsibilities. This presupposes that the West
will not speak a crusading language and that the Soviets will
cease to found their policy on the certainty of the collapse of
the other system. It further presupposes their willingness to
take into account the right of others to security instead of
being content to assert their own, and that they modify their
methods in places where the evolution of society and men's
aspirations so require, as in Poland. With our historical links
to Eastern Europe and sensitivity to the unjust division of our
continent, we Europeans hope that the Soviet Union will
gradually find a way to accept self-determination and observance
of basic human rights in the area it controls.

Richard Nixon Former President of the U.S. (1969-74)

There are those who believe that just acting tough and keeping
the Soviets guessing is the best way to keep them restrained.
That is a very dangerous attitude, and I speak as a hawk. I
want the military balance restored. And I want an arms-control
agreement that denies both sides a first-strike capability.
The leaders of the Soviet Union and the U.S. must work out a
process, rules of engagement, to prevent their mutual
destruction.

The Soviet leaders may be wrong. They may be evil, and they
certainly think we are evil, but they are rational. They are
not like Hitler. They are concerned that the differences
between the U.S. and them may explode into war. They want to
win, but they want to win without war.

The first thing we need to do now, on the various arms-control
fronts, is nothing. There would be no greater mistake than for
the U.S. and the Europeans to say, "My God, we've done
something wrong, and we have to make some concessions to get
them back to the table."  That would be negotiating under duress
and would encourage walkouts in the future. In the longer term,
I think they will come back because it is in their interest to
do so.

We do need, however, to leapfrog the sterile arms-control
debate and broaden the dialogue and the agenda to include other
factors. We have to explore the possibilities of some
initiatives in other areas that might attract their interest.

On the economic front, our current trade is too small to make
it an effective weapon. But with the Japanese and the European
shares added, it is large. I thought it was a mistake to give
upon the grain embargo without getting something in return.
But economic leverage must be used subtly and firmly.

On Third World problems, we share with the Soviets the desire
of not wanting to leave our fate in the hands of others. The
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries may be the
most important new problem of the next 20 years. The Soviets
have as much interest as we do in seeing that controlled. They
do not want that danger anymore than we do.

It is important to go forward without military research in
space, but this will be destabilizing unless we offer to share
that information with the Soviet Union. As a gesture of good
faith, and as a demonstration that we are not trying to build
a shield that will lt us win a nuclear war, we should offer our
discoveries to the Soviet Union.

All this argues that there needs to be a relationship between
the Soviet Union and the U.S. at the highest level, a
relationship of hardheaded detente. Since the Secretary of
State or the National Security Adviser are too busy, I think a
special person should be named by the President to focus
entirely on the relationship with the Soviet Union. The Soviets
should have a similar person. Then there could be summitry
without the leaders themselves.

Finally, it is vitally important the these two men, Reagan and
Andropov, meet. I don't want them to meet just to shake hands,
but they can meet to agree on a process whereby more
negotiations will take place on arms control and other matters.
But because it is the right thing, my instincts tell me it will
happen.

Bob Hawke Prime Minister of Australia

We should not allow ourselves to be overwhelmed by a sense of
global pessimism or imminent disaster. Australia does not
accept that the nuclear-weapons states alone have the right to
determine these issues. Their calculations--or
miscalculations--could have terrible consequences for all of us.
We do not consider that unilateral disarmament would be an
effective way of bringing about an end to the arms race. What
is required is realistic, concrete and balanced proposals that
have at their heart a recognition of the national security
interests involved.

The Australian government has greatly elevated arms control and
disarmament goals within our foreign policy. As a member of
every multilateral disarmament body, Australia is promoting the
negotiation of treaties to  end nuclear testing and to ban
chemical weapons, and space. We are also helping to strengthen
measures against the spread of nuclear weapons. For countries
such as our, there is no substitute for the hard slog of
multilateral negotiations designed to engage the interests and
support of the superpowers. We recently encouraged by a U.N.
vote in which this year the U.S. changed its vote, thereby
bringing us closer to negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban
treaty.

The withdrawal of the U.S.S.R. from the INF talks of course
worries us. The Soviet position on this seems to me to
overlook the fact that their deployment of SS-20s threatened the
balance of power in Europe in the first place. I urge Mr.
Andropov to think again on this. In the longer term, I believe
that both superpowers have compelling reasons of acute national
interest to pursue arms-control agreements. Progress will
probably be achieved in gradual steps and only after difficult
negotiations.

I would stress that adequate and effective provision for
verification is the crucial precondition for progress.
Australia wants to make a constructive and realistic
contribution within our means. In this connection, the joint
U.S.-Australian facilities on our soil play an important role
in arms-control verification as well as maintaining Western
security. We are upgrading our capacity to monitor nuclear
explosions by seismic means.

On the assumption that the more lurid public accounts of
disarray in the Soviet leadership are not true, I would like to
see a properly prepared summit between Presidents Reagan and
Andropov next year. As well as putting arms control back on
track, I would be looking for some sign of greater understanding
between them on the  Middle East in particular. Frankly, the
convergence of superpower rivalry and indigenous instability
there at the moment worries me more than the arms race itself.

Zbigniew Brezezinski National Security Adviser (1977-81)

The U.S.-Soviet relationship is today quite normal, and this is
all to the good. Unlike the past, when American public opinion
tended to swing from euphoria about detente to hysteria about
the cold war, the public correctly perceives Soviet-American
relations as basically antagonistic and competitive, though
linked by a common interest in survival.

We should have no illusions, however, that the antagonism will
quickly wane. Our histories, geographies, politics and global
interests are so varied that for a long time to come we will
remain rivals. Regional conflicts in the Middle East and
Central America will continue to fuel that global rivalry.
Accordingly, we should concentrate on what can be done to
minimize the chances of a direct collision. three initiatives
would help:

1. Instead of seeking a comprehensive and complex START
treaty, with all its negotiating and verification pitfalls, we
should settle for a limited, interim agreement. For the time
being, I would forgo the more ambitious Reagan proposals for
across-the- board reductions, including major cuts in
throw-weight and warheads. Instead, I would accept the most
recent Soviet counter proposal for a mutual scale-down to 1,800
launchers, but with added joint limit of, say, 7,500 warheads.
Such a simple interim agreement would break the logjam, be
easier to verify, provide the basis for a wider treaty later,
and we could have it by next summer.

2. Initiate genuinely consultative annual U.S.-Soviet summits. I
first proposed this back in l977, and the idea has been endorsed
recently by both Mr. Nixon and Mr. Mondale. Our leaders should
simply get together once a year for three or so days of truly
informal talks so that we gain gradually better understanding
of our differences, but without expecting unattainable
accommodations. Greater mutual sensitivity to our conflicting
positions would in itself help to keep the competition more
stable.

3. Widen the annual economic summit with our principal allies
into a strategic-economic summit, so that we can review
together more systematically how best to handle the East-west
relationship, thus minimizing the differences among ourselves,
which the Soviets are always tempted to exploit.

In brief, in order to avoid a head-on collision we have to
collaborate with our political enemy even while competing
assertively.

Richard Von Weizsacker Major of West Berlin and sole candidate
for election as President of West Germany

We must concentrate our efforts on conducting a positive policy
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, today more than ever. This means
on the one hand that we must not tempt Moscow into regarding
our defense capacity as something we are prepared to
compromise. Thirty-eight years of experience have taught
Berliners better than anyone else that the protection of our
freedom rests above all on the American commitment. For this
help and engagement, we are deeply grateful.

But a decisive point is that we use our freedom to achieve good
relations with the Soviet Union, rather than confrontation.
East-West relations today are preoccupied with disarmament,
rearmament or arms control. Experience teaches that it is not
disarmament that points the way to peace, but rather that
peaceful relations open the door to disarmament. States arm
themselves against one another when there are poor relations
between them, when they have no common interests or when they
have no common interests or when these are not developed, when
cooperation is rejected or not even attempted. But where
concrete fields of cooperation are exploited or created, arms
problems present a smaller obstacle to peace. Neither
rearmament nor disarmament. neither confrontation nor peace
movements, neither hawks nor doves bring about peace. Peace is
the consequence of practical cooperation.

The Helsinki accords divide East-West relations into three
categories; security, cooperation and the free movement of
people. Wisely, it was agreed that all three categories should
be regarded only in context and as being of equal value.
Security matters, taken on their own, offer too little chance
of success. The same applies to an isolated policy concerning
the free movement of people. Cooperation is of paramount
importance. If we succeed in extending, step by step,
cooperation in the fields of science, food, ecology,
transportation, economics, energy and development policy, then
arms control and  even free movement of people will ultimately
come into the range of what is possible. However, if we refuse
to cooperate with the Soviets in these field, in which they have
always lagged behind, and if we instead demand concessions in
the only area in which they are equal or superior to the West,
namely in armaments, we shall have to wait a long time for
security, human rights and a secure peace. Our goal is a policy
that combines strong defense and cooperation with the Soviet
Union.

Francis Pym Former British Foreign Secretary (1982-83)

My first recommendation is to stop shouting. A period of
relative silence would be healthy.

My second is to begin a process that will lead to increased
dialogue. After recent years, that would take time anyway:
Andropov's illness means to the Soviet Union has a leadership
problem in the immediate future. That has to be understood and
may cause delay.

My third is for us in the West to be ready for the time when
the Soviets return to the negotiating table, which in my
judgment is likely to happen by the summer months, and be
prepared, if that were helpful, to continue medium-range missile
talks in a different arms-control format, possibly through the
START talks. In the meantime, NATO should mount a major drive
in all 16 member countries, with the total support of each
government, designed to explain and explain again to our
electorates the strategy of deterrence and its effectiveness in
influencing the Soviet Union not to attack us. Confidence must
be restored in the minds of our peoples. Nuclear weapons induce
fear. Of course, so does some rhetoric. When confidence is
restored and calmness returns, there will be a better
environment for dialogue.

More attention must be given to European-American relations.
Misunderstandings abound. To many Europeans, Reagan looks like
a warmonger. To many Americans, Europeans seem unaware of the
Communist threat from the Soviet union and contribute too
little to NATO. The causes of such misreadings are clear, but
we cannot afford them.

We must coordinate more closely our perceptions and handling of
regional disputes. The very interdependence of our world means
that the interests of the West may be as directly threatened by
events outside the NATO area as inside it, and I feel it may be
time we reviewed our crisis management mechanisms. Each
component of the alliance, while accepting that agreement will
not always be possible, should at least ensure that the others
know the course of action it intends to pursue and try to
evolve joint reactions.

The Soviet Union has enormous problems: economic, political and
social. It will not solve them buy continuing the political
doctrine that created them. Let us understand, therefore, the
nightmare that faces the Russian leaders and leave them alone
to sort themselves out.

Dean Rusk Secretary of State in the Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations (1961-69)

The U.S. and the Soviet Union share a massive common interest--
the prevention of an all-out nuclear war. We are the only two
nations that, if locked in deadly combat, could raise a serious
question as to whether this planet can any longer sustain the
human race. It follows that Washington and Moscow bear a heavy
and special responsibility toward the peace of the world and
the survival of the human race. That should be the beginning
of any consideration in both capitals of our mutual relations.

The rhetorical level between Washington and Moscow has reached
unusual levels of acrimony. Both capitals should take care
because there is a self-hypnotic effect in rhetoric that could
cause one or both to begin to believe their own excessive
vituperation and lead to dangers that we ought to try to avoid.
We now have put behind us more than 38 years since a nuclear
weapon has been fired in anger, despite many serious crises we
have had since 1945. The Soviets have no more interest in the
destruction of our beloved America. Both sides must avoid the
game of "chicken"--pressing to see how far one or the other can
go without crossing that lethal threshold.

An urgent and immediate problem is to find some way to put a
limit to what is becoming an insane race in nuclear weapons.
Such negotiations cannot be easy, but the effort has to be
made. Both in the Soviet Union and in the U.S. the influence of
military thinking seems to be in the ascendancy, if for
different reasons. Both capitals must find a way to put a brake
on the demands of their respective military purposes.

An immediate problem that needs the most serious attention is
the prospect that we shall be moving the arms race into outer
space. Without getting into the scientific and technical debate
as to whether antiballistic missile capabilities are possible
through such esoteric space weapons, two things should be clear.
First, we must assume that the Soviets will be able to do
whatever we manage to do, after spending hundreds of billions
of dollars in the effort. Secondly, we can be sure that if we
or the Soviets, or both, begin to approach success in devising
such space weapons, there will be a frantic race on both sides
to devise offensive missiles that can penetrate or evade such
defenses. The prospect is, therefore, that we shall be spending
hundreds of billions of dollars, perhaps trillions, with no
perceptible underlying change in the strategic relations between
the two countries. Before we pollute the wondrous heavens with
the folly of man, surely we should put our heads together to try
to find some way to avoid this dismal prospect. As common
members of Homo sapiens, perhaps we can also find a way to put
our heads together to address some of the urgent problems to be
faced in the coming decades by the entire human race in such
fields as energy, the environment, the population explosion and
world hunger. Little by little such common necessities may lay
a restraining hand upon the forces that would move us toward
violent conflict.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau Prime Minister of Canada

Following the commitment made by leaders of seven
industrialized nations at the Williamsburg summit last May to
devote our full political energy to the search for peace, I
undertook a personal initiative to seek ways to improve
East-West relations. When the two largest military powers each
have over 20,000 nuclear weapons, any one of which is many times
more powerful than the bombs that devastated Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, their relationship is of vital interest to all
nations. I believe each individual leader must see the search
for stability as a personal responsibility. It is far too
important to be left to the superpowers alone.

Despite periods of fruitful negotiations, and despite some
valuable treaties, both sides bristle with nuclear arms, the
number and sophistication of which increase every year. In
seeking to reduce world tensions it is not sufficient to deal
with abstract equations and the relative capabilities of this
weapon over that. What is at issue is not just the capacity of
these weapons for destruction, but the intentions of the
governments that control them:  the superpowers must each be
convinced of the good intentions of the other.

I have met with NATO leaders in Europe, the Commonwealth heads
of government in New Delhi, as well as Japanese and Chinese
leaders, and most recently with President Reagan in Washington.
I shared with them amy conviction that we cannot hope to see
real progress in the negotiations for arms control and
disarmament until there is an injection of high-level political
energy into these negotiations and into the East-West
relationship itself.

I am very encouraged by indications that the process has now
begun. At their recent meeting in Brussels, NATO foreign
ministers accepted the need for mutual respect for the
legitimate security interests of both superpowers. they
reiterated their belief in genuine detente and a relationship
between East and West based on equilibrium, moderation and
reciprocity; perhaps more important, they eschewed aspirations
to military superiority. The Western agreement to send
political leaders, rather than diplomats, to Stockholm in
January and NATO's commitment to make a new political effort at
the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces indicate a
growing acceptance that political leaders must personally
involve themselves in the peace process.

It is also heartening that President Reagan, in his recent
speech in Japan, stated his belief that a nuclear war is not
winnable and must never be fought, noted his desire to eliminate
all nuclear weapons and stressed his willingness to compromise
in order to achieve significant reductions in the level of
armaments threatening mankind. These are positive indications
that improvements in the relationship are possible.

I believe that the Soviet Union shares the desire for peace,
and I hope we will soon see similarly positive signs from them
that we might aspire, not just to a more stable balance of
terror, but to a real and lasting peace.